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executive SummAry
On April 19, 2011 Pakistan conducted the 
first test flight of Hatf-IX (NASR) missile. The 
Pakistani Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) 
described the missile as a ‘Short Range Surface 
to Surface Ballistic Missile’. Till date there have 
been three tests of the missile system on April 
19, 2011, May 29, 2012 and February 11, 2013. 
After each of the flight tests, the ISPR put out a 
largely identical press statement which stressed 
on the point that the “missile has been devel-
oped to add deterrence value to Pakistan’s 
Strategic Weapons Development programme 
at shorter ranges.” Further the press release 
went on to state that the 60km NASR “carries a 
nuclear warhead of appropriate yield with high 
accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes.”
Following the Pakistani tests and claims 
of NASR being a nuclear capable missile, there 
has been a lot of analysis pointing to the dan-
gers it poses for Indo-Pak deterrence. However, 
despite the large amount of literature which 
has come out following the NASR test in April 
2011, not much attention has been directed at 
carrying out a holistic assessment of the tactical 
nuclear weapons issue. It is this crucial gap that 
that this report seeks to address. 
The NASR poses important challenges for 
nuclear stability between India and Pakistan. 
However, in order to understand the drivers and 
Pakistan’s thinking behind NASR, it is crucial to 
get a handle on the countries’ thinking about 
nuclear deterrence. The nuclear doctrines and 
policy statements by both countries as well as 
the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001-02 border 
mobilisation provides insights into  Islamabad 
and New Delhi’s thinking about nuclear weap-
ons and deterrence. 
In the absence of a formal nuclear doc-
trine enunciated by Pakistan, the outlines of 
one can be inferred by the statements of impor-
tant decision-makers.  The main characteristics 
of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine and weapons are 
the following. Firstly, they are primarily direct-
ed towards India; second, it espouses a policy 
of nuclear first-use; thirdly, it views its nuclear 
weapons as deterring all forms of external ag-
gression including any conventional military of-
fensive by India. 
India on the other hand views nuclear 
weapons as political weapons whose sole aim 
is to deter any use of nuclear weapons against 
India by an adversary. India espouses a no-first 
use policy; pursues a credible minimum deter-
rent and has adopted a policy of massive re-
sponse in case of a nuclear strike against India 
or its forces anywhere. 
The overt nuclearisation of the Indo-Pak 
relationship with the 1998 nuclear tests led to 
a belief in Islamabad that its nuclear deterrent 
provided it with a cover for a conventional con-
flict. This was in essence the thought process 
behind Kargil. However, the strong Indian re-
sponse to Kargil, points to the fact that India 
would respond - despite nuclear weapons - with 
military force in case its territory was occupied. 
At the same time, it is also important to take 
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note of the fact that despite the option being 
on the table, India decided against expanding 
the Kargil conflict horizontally. However it is 
important to note that New Delhi did not rule 
out such a possibility. 
The December 2001 attack on the Indian 
Parliament by Pak-supported terror groups 
like Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT) led to the largest Indian military 
mobilisation since the 1971 Indo-Pak war. This 
was followed by a border stand-off by Indian 
and Pakistani armies which lasted for almost 
two years. The terror attack was the result of 
Pakistan’s belief that given its nuclear deterrent 
it could carry on its support of terrorist groups 
in their strikes against India. India in response 
chose a policy of compellence in order to force 
Pakistan to change its policy of supporting such 
groups on the belief that its nuclear deterrence 
would deter India from responding convention-
ally. Despite criticisms about what India actu-
ally achieved out of Operation Parakram, it is 
crucial to note the international pressure and 
financial burden the mobilisation imposed on 
Pakistan. India was thus sending a signal to 
Pakistan that continuing with its policy would 
entail costs. 
Thus, Indian responses during both the 
1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001-02 crisis can 
be seen as New Delhi’s attempt to test Pakistan’s 
nuclear threshold. The two crises provide valu-
able insight into the different understanding of 
nuclear deterrence prevalent in both countries 
which holds much value for the currently un-
folding situation with the introduction of NASR. 
For Pakistan, not much changed with 
the overt nuclearisation of the sub-continent. 
For Islamabad, India’s conventional military 
strength coupled with its lack of strategic depth 
emanating from its own smaller physical size 
continue to be a major concern. These twin fac-
tors were very important in its decision mak-
ing calculus and in fashioning its view of nu-
clear weapons and deterrence. It is important 
to note that Pakistan went ahead with Kargil 
despite both countries having gone nuclear in 
May 1998. This reinforces the argument that 
Islamabad views its nuclear deterrent as a coun-
ter to its conventional military asymmetry vis-a-
vis India; thereby providing Islamabad with the 
space to carry out Kargil type operations with 
the threat of escalation of the conflict spectrum 
to the nuclear realm. 
However, India’s reactions in both the situ-
ations is important to take note of. Indian re-
sponse to Pakistani incursions in Kargil points 
to the fact that - despite the nuclear backdrop 
- India will act if its territory was occupied. 
Similarly, Indian response to the 2001 terrorist 
attacks also points to the likelihood that there is 
an Indian threshold of suffering when it comes to 
terror attacks by Pak-supported groups. Clearly, 
the 2001 attacks on the Parliament crossed that 
threshold. Thus despite deciding not to cross 
into Pakistan, India does have options to make 
life difficult and costly for the Pakistani state 
if it decides not to do a rethink on its current 
policy of supporting terrorist groups in carrying 
out attacks against Pakistan. 
Learning from the 1999 Kargil conflict and 
the 2001-02 crisis, the Indian Army unveiled 
its new doctrine in April 2004. The doctrine 
was popularly termed as ‘Cold Start’ given its 
attempt to reduce the mobilization times. It 
was seen as indicative of India’s willingness to 
modify its traditionally defensive orientation to 
conflicts/wars and undertake a more pro-active 
and nimbler stance by launching limited wars in 
an NBC environment.  The doctrine also sought 
to address the issue of the lack of an element of 
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surprise during Operation Parakram.
Pakistan has been concerned about India’s 
new military doctrine since it took away 
Pakistan’s rationale of issuing the threat of the 
conventional war escalating into a nuclear war. 
As India was no longer fighting a conventional 
all-out war, it arguably would be fighting be-
low Pakistan’s nuclear ‘red-lines’. This appears 
to have unnerved Pakistan to a great extent 
and they felt it necessary to restore the earlier 
equation by lowering the nuclear threshold. 
The short range Tactical Nuclear Weapon NASR 
was the resulting brainwave. Through NASR, 
Pakistan is seen to be exploring the space for a 
flexible response which falls between a massive 
response and doing nothing. 
The NASR warhead section has been es-
timated to have a cylindrical section which is 
361 mm in diameter and 940 mm long with a 
conical portion which is 660 mm long. Thus, 
the important question is whether (a) Pakistan 
has a miniaturized weapon warhead which will 
fit into this dimension, (b) whether it has been 
tested and (c) in the absence of tests, how re-
liable is the weapon system. Most importantly, 
in the absence of demonstrated reliability, how 
confident will Pakistan be in fielding it?
In May 1998, Pakistan had tested only 
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) based de-
vices. There is wide discrepancy between the 
Pakistani claims of the weapon yield and the in-
ternational estimates. Even if we accept the AQ 
Khan statement on tactical weapons, we are not 
wiser on its size; the smallest ballistic missile 
tested, when AQ Khan made the statement was 
the Hatf-1 which was 560 mm in diameter and 
had a range of 80 km. If a weapon system had 
been designed for Hatf-1 as claimed by Khan, it 
would be too large to fit into the envelope avail-
able with NASR. 
Further miniaturization to fit into the 
NASR class of missiles can probably come with 
a Plutonium based linear implosion device. 
However, such a device requires larger quan-
tity - almost double - of plutonium as opposed 
to the requirement in spherical compression. 
A Pakistani design of such a device can be ex-
pected to weigh at least 100 kg. Pakistan can at 
best work on the explosive + detonator com-
bination with surrogate material, which is not 
the same as testing with the actual material. In 
the end, what Pakistan will have is an untested 
device. 
It is difficult to assess Pakistan’s weapon 
priorities and hence the fissile material produc-
tion strategy. While Pakistan’s weapons pro-
gramme is primarily based on enriched ura-
nium, the setting up of the Khushab series of 
reactors indicates that Pakistan is seriously con-
sidering the Plutonium option. Therefore the 
issue is one of Uranium availability especially 
as Pakistan’s own reserves are limited and of 
poor ore concentration. As a non-member state 
of the NPT regime, it cannot import uranium 
for strategic purposes. Pakistan will have to do 
a major balancing act between the HEU and 
Plutonium production-maybe even freeze the 
production of HEU.
Will Pakistan consider its tested HEU 
weapons in stock as adequate for its security 
or will it consider it necessary to diversify its 
stockpile? Another important question to con-
sider is whether Pakistan will divert all or part 
of its uranium reserves for production of an un-
tested Plutonium based weapon. Even here will 
Islamabad lay stress on Plutonium weapons for 
use with its cruise missiles like Babur and Ra’ad 
or will it deploy them on NASR despite its rath-
er limited damage potential against tanks and 
armoured personnel vehicles.
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Based on the above observations, the following 
points emerge:
	With NASR, Pakistan in essence has 
fallen back on its time-tested option of 
threatening to use its nuclear weapons 
in an attempt to involve the international 
community and thereby counter India’s 
conventional military asymmetry.
	Pakistan’s thinking behind employing 
NASR could be a search by its decision-
makers for a flexible response; some-
thing between massive (suicidal) re-
sponse, engaging in conventional battle, 
and doing nothing. NASR, as viewed in 
Pakistan, fits in with the desire for grad-
ed punitive retaliatory option. 
	The added danger NASR poses is the 
possibility of pre-delegation of the weap-
on to battlefield commanders in case of 
a conflict. Pre-delegation of a nuclear 
weapon poses several challenges as seen 
from the American and Soviet Cold War 
experience. Pre-delegation of nuclear 
weapons increases the chances of both 
inadvertent and unauthorized use. In 
addition, due to weaker command and 
control given the fact that the weapons 
might be used in a battlefield scenario; 
it also raises the dangers of the actual 
weapon system falling into hands of the 
advancing adversary (Indian forces) as 
well as jehadi groups with or without in-
sider help.
	NASR signifies a shift in Pakistan’s nu-
clear strategy from a ‘first-use’ to one of 
‘first-strike.’ Given that Pakistan would 
loathe to give up its low-cost, low-risk 
and high benefit strategy of support-
ing groups carrying out terror strikes 
against India, NASR is a Pakistani ploy 
crafted to deny India the space to re-
spond to such terror strikes by threaten-
ing to lower its nuclear threshold. 
	Pakistan’s ‘graded retaliatory option’ 
will be in direct conflict with India’s nu-
clear doctrine which does not differen-
tiate between a tactical and a strategic 
nuclear weapon strike.
	As NASR and its capability is a claim 
- a claim not substantiated by demon-
strated test, India has chosen to ignore 
it. India can afford to do so as it has its 
own (proven) ability to deploy a sub-
kiloton if it so desires.
	The Indian nuclear doctrine does not 
distinguish between tactical and strate-
gic nuclear weapons or such use. India 
continues to adopt a no-first use (NFU) 
policy and its nuclear doctrine clearly 
assures ‘massive retaliation inflicting 
unacceptable damage’ against ‘nuclear 
attack on Indian territory or on Indian 
forces anywhere.’ (emphasis added by 
authors)
Thus, Pakistan’s gambit of using NASR to 
signal a lowering of its nuclear threshold to 
counter any conventional military operation by 
India is likely to pose challenges for robustness 
of nuclear deterrence between Pakistan and 
India. An important question to ponder over 
and one that holds some importance for nuclear 
stability in the Indian sub-continent is whether 
NASR is leading Pakistan into a ‘commitment 
trap.’ It would be wise to guard against a situa-
tion where Pakistan would be forced to follow 
through just because of its past assertions. 
The study shows that a weapon system like 
NASR has more disadvantages than advantages 
from all considerations ranging from damage 
potential to impact on deterrence stability. 
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INtRoductIoN
On April 19, 2011 Pakistan conducted the 
first test flight of Hatf-IX (NASR) missile. The 
Pakistani Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) 
described the missile as a ‘Short Range Surface 
to Surface Ballistic Missile’. Till date there 
have been three tests of the missile system on 
April 19, 2011, May 29, 2012 and February 11, 
2013. After each of the flight tests, the ISPR put 
out a largely identical press statement which 
stressed on the point that the “missile has been 
developed to add deterrence value to Pakistan’s 
Strategic Weapons Development programme 
at shorter ranges.” Further the press release 
went on to state that the 60km NASR “carries a 
nuclear warhead of appropriate yield with high 
accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes.”1
Following the Pakistani tests and claims of 
NASR being a nuclear capable missile, there has 
been a lot of analysis pointing to the dangers it 
poses for Indo-Pak deterrence. However, despite 
the large amount of literature which has come 
out following the NASR test in April 2011, not 
much attention has been directed at carrying 
out a holistic assessment of the tactical nuclear 
weapons issue. It is this crucial gap that that 
this report seeks to address. 
To this end, the report will begin with a 
HAtf-ix/ nASr - PAkiStAn’S tActicAl nucleAr 
weAPon: imPlicAtionS for indo-PAk deterrence
brief analysis of the definitional issues which 
plague any attempt at categorising tactical 
nuclear weapons. This section will attempt to 
point out that any categorisation on the basis of 
yield, launch location, range is largely cosmetic 
especially when the most important criterion 
is how nuclear weapons are employed. Such a 
decision would no doubt be influenced by the 
adversary’s forces and capabilities and one’s 
impression of what would cause maximum ‘pain’ 
to one’s adversary. Also, any such assumption is 
largely speculative because of the lack of access 
to information about how these weapons are 
planned to be employed, given that they form 
part of strategic war plans and are among the 
most closely guarded secrets of a country.
Also, important to study and hopefully 
learn from are the historical understanding 
of deterrence both prior to advent of nuclear 
weapons and during the Cold War when most 
of one’s focus was on nuclear weapons and 
deterrence. Given the context of the study, 
focus will also be on how nuclear deterrence 
has panned out and understood by India and 
Pakistan. The case of the 1999 Kargil conflict 
and the 2001-02 border mobilisation will be 
used to glean a better understanding of what 
nuclear deterrence means in both countries 
1 Inter Services Public Relations, “Press Release,” No PR94/2011-ISPR, April 19, 2011, available at http://
www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1721; Inter Services Public Relations, “Press Re-
lease,” No PR130/2012-ISPR, May 29, 2012, available at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_
release&id=2075;  Inter Services Public Relations, “Press Release,” No PR17/2013-ISPR, February 11, 2013, 
available at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2013/2/11
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and how their varying understandings would 
impinge on the impact of NASR on nuclear 
stability in the Indian sub-continent.
It is also important to point out that from 
the very first test of the NASR by Pakistan in April 
2011, there have been doubts about Pakistan’s 
capability to field such a device. This report 
therefore, using openly available images, carries 
out a sizing of the NASR thereby estimating 
the envelope available for fitting in a nuclear 
warhead. It then delves into the challenges in 
developing a miniaturised warhead to fit into 
these dimensions. Also important in this calculus 
is the important aspect of Islamabad’s stockpile 
management and weapon priorities especially 
owing to the fact that it has limited natural 
uranium deposits of rather poor concentration. 
Given that Pakistan is claiming NASR to 
be a battlefield nuclear device, Islamabad is 
threatening to use the weapon system to deter 
any conventional military assault by India 
in response to a sub-conventional (terrorist) 
attack against India by Pakistan-supported 
terrorist groups. In case one takes Pakistan’s 
claim at face value, it would translate into 
possible modifications in Pakistan’s existing 
nuclear command and control structure. Thus, 
the report details the existing nuclear command 
and control mechanism and the likely changes 
and dangers therein due to the possibility that 
NASR would be pre-delegated to the battlefield 
commanders. In the ‘fog of war’ this could lead 
to problems for the robustness of deterrence 
and increase the possibility of inadvertent use 
of a nuclear weapon as well as such a weapon 
falling into the hands of terrorists or even the 
enemy forces.
What will be the impact that NASR will 
have on the robustness of nuclear deterrence 
between India and Pakistan? This is especially 
important given the doubts about whether the 
missile is nuclear capable given the warhead’s 
untested nature. Also, it is important to note the 
fact that doctrinally, the space that Pakistan is 
seeking to achieve - between massive retaliation 
and doing nothing - by way of NASR, just does 
not exist in light of India’s nuclear doctrine. 
Therefore, the report points to the likelihood 
that rather than adding ‘deterrence value’ NASR 
ends up weakening the strength of Pakistan’s 
nuclear deterrent by raising doubts in Pakistan’s 
adversaries’ minds about their deterrent. This 
ends up further complicating the deterrence 
matrix and posing greater challenges for 
stability between India and Pakistan. 
defINItIoNal ISSueS 
One of the first issues that one grapples 
with when writing about tactical nuclear 
weapons is the ‘definitional’ one. What is the 
correct way to identify this class/category of 
weapons? This also involves the larger question 
as to whether there is any merit or whether 
it is useful or necessary to delineate them as 
a separate category of weapons in the first 
place. At the end of the day, what matters is 
whether or not nuclear weapons are used; 
and if they are, how would they be employed. 
Any categorisation of nuclear weapons is thus 
largely cosmetic. In the absence of a clear cut 
agreement on what to call these weapons, they 
have been given different terms which have 
been used to describe such weapons. Common 
among which are ‘battlefield’, ‘tactical’, ‘sub-
strategic’ and ‘non-strategic’ nuclear weapons. 
A case for separate classification for such 
weapons has been made on the basis of their 
yield, range among other such distinguishing 
characteristics. Such classification assumes that 
tactical weapons generally have smaller yields 
3NatioNal iNstitute of advaNced studies
and ranges. However, this is not necessarily 
true as there are cases where tactical nuclear 
weapons have yields which are larger as 
compared to strategic weapons. Similarly, it 
cannot be assumed that nuclear weapons which 
are delivered to smaller ranges have lesser 
yields.
A case in point is the American B-61 (Mk-
61) nuclear warhead which has several versions 
or Mod-3,4,7,10,11 and the Mod-12 which is 
currently being developed.2 The yields of the 
various Mods ranged from 300 tonnes to 400 
Kt. The B-61 is the tactical weapon deployed 
with five NATO allies in Europe. The yield of this 
‘tactical’ weapon is much larger when compared 
to several other ‘strategic’ weapons like the 
W-76 (Mk-4) warhead carried in the submarine 
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) from British 
and the American nuclear submarines SSBNs.3 
The W-76 is believed to have a yield of about 
100Kt which is much lower than the 400Kt of 
the B-61 tactical nuclear warhead. Thus, yield 
is not a very prudent barometer for classifying 
weapons as tactical or strategic.
Another way in which such weapons are 
defined is ‘by exclusion’. What this translates to 
is that all weapons which do not come under the 
ambit of any current arms control treaties will 
be termed as non-strategic or tactical nuclear 
weapons. This is also a problematic way to 
define/categorise such weapons as this would 
be applicable only to the US and the Russian 
context. 
Yet another manner for differentiating 
between strategic and tactical weapons could 
be on the basis of location of launch. In case a 
weapon system when launched from one’s own 
national territory (or submarine) is able to reach 
targets in the adversary’s territory, it can be 
termed as a strategic weapon.4 However, such a 
definition too is problematic because of the fact 
that despite being largely specific to US-Russian 
situation, it does not hold true in all cases even 
for these countries. For instance, American/
NATO nuclear missiles launched from Europe 
would be able to reach targets in Russia and 
for all practical purposes would be perceived by 
Russians as being strategic weapons.5
2 The B61 Life Extension Program (LEP) and in particular the B61-12 warhead production and delivery programme 
have faced several time and cost overruns. Originally scheduled for delivery in the Nuclear Posture Review in 
2017 has already been pushed back to 2019 or even later citing sequestration budget cuts. Also the cost of the 
programme has gone up from the initial US$ 4billion to US$ 10 billion. See Hans M. Kristensen, “B61-12: NNSA’s 
Gold-Plated Nuclear Bomb Project,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, July 26, 2012, available at http://blogs.fas.org/
security/2012/07/b61-12gold/ ; Hans M. Kristensen, “Additional Delays Expected in B61-12 Nuclear Bomb 
Schedule,” February 21, 2013, FAS Strategic Security Blog, http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/02/b61-12delay/ 
. In comparison the B61-11 received the final go-ahead from the US Congress in July 1995 with the first B61-11 
entering the stockpile January 1997. See  “Nuclear Brief April 2005,” The Nuclear Information Project, July 15, 
2005, available at http://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/B61-11.htm 
3 “The W76 Warhead,” The Nuclear Weapon Archive, January 2007, available at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/
Usa/Weapons/W76.html
4 A. Carnesale, P. Doty, S. Hoffman, S. Huntington, J. Nye, S. Sagan, Living with Nuclear Weapons, Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1983, pg. 126 cited in Brian Alexander and Alistair Millar Eds., Tactical Nuclear Weapons: 
Emergent Threats in an Evolving Security Environment, 2003, Washington D.C: Brassey’s Inc, pg. 49.
5 This was pointed to the American delegation by the Soviet team at the start of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT) talks. See, “Interview with Leslie H. Gelb,” Episode No. 19, George Washington University, National Security 
Archive, February 28, 1999, available at  http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-19/gelb2.
html
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Thus, attempts at arriving at such 
definitions and categorisation are largely 
cosmetic given that it is more important to 
see how these weapons are employed. A 
short range weapon will also be a strategic 
weapon if used in a geographical locale like 
the Indian sub-continent where the flight 
distances and therefore the flight times are 
fairly short. If seen in terms of yield, a lower 
yield weapon would fulfil the deterrent role 
as well as a megaton nuclear device; also it 
would assume a strategic role when used 
against say ‘counterforce’ rather than ‘counter 
value’ targets. Also, whether a weapon will be 
employed against a counterforce or a counter 
value target will depend on the strategic war 
plans of the country; something which has 
never been disclosed and is not likely to be 
disclosed by countries even in the future.
For purpose of this report, we have chosen 
to define tactical nuclear weapons on the basis 
of the following three parameters. 
	Use in a limited theatre of battle: 200-
300 kms;
	Range of the missile: ≤100kms;
	Mass of the nuclear warhead such a 
missile system can deliver: 100-150 kgs.
Such a definition is important to put forth 
because, inter alia, both India and Pakistan 
have longer range, nuclear capable missiles. 
Given this reality, identifying a cut-off point 
distinguishing between these two weapon 
systems becomes important. This however does 
not take away the real problems one encounters 
when trying to define what a tactical nuclear 
weapon entails. However, the fact remains that 
any such definition is superficial because a 
nuclear weapon is unlike any other weapon, in 
terms of the dangers it poses. 
deteRReNce: a bRIef HIStoRIcal SettINg
Science fiction writer H.G. Wells predicted 
nuclear weapons and deterrence when he stated 
in his book The World Set Free, that the massive 
destructive power released by the atoms would 
result in world peace.6 
Much of the scholarship during the Cold 
War emphasised the counter-value aspects of the 
weapon and its potential to deter an adversary 
by way of the threat of punishment it held forth. 
However, deterrence pre-dates the emergence 
of nuclear weapons by a fair margin. The older 
conception of deterrence is captured by Snyder 
when he talks of ‘deterrence by denial’ in his 
book Deterrence and Defence. 
During the First World War, German planes 
like the Zeppelin carried out aerial bombings in 
the UK but consciously avoided British civilian 
targets. Such ‘counterforce’ targets included 
the London Docklands, military bases, fuel, 
ammunition and other military stores, military 
barracks. The German decision to restrict aerial 
bombings to military targets was the result of the 
fear that Britain could also retaliate in kind and 
attack German cities.7  British planners during 
and following the Great War also discussed the 
possibility of delivering a ‘knockout blow’ which 
included attack on cities (counter value) targets 
6 H.G. Wells, The World Set Free, London: Macmillan, 1914 available online at http://www.gutenberg.org/
files/1059/1059-h/1059-h.htm
7 David Payne, “The Bombing Of Britain In The Great War,” December 2008, Western Front Association, available at 
http://www.westernfrontassociation.com/component/content/article/121-aerial-warfare/876-bombing-britain-
war.html ; Martin Gilbert, The First World War: A Complete History, London: Henry Holt and Company, 2004.
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so as to inflict such massive pain which would 
be extremely painful and paralysing.8
During the run-up to the Great War, an 
intriguing debate raged in the maritime domain, 
which also points to the interesting debate 
on deterrence in the years preceding nuclear 
weapons. Given that the British Navy was by far 
the largest and the most superior navy in the 
world at that point in time, there was debate 
among strategists and policy makers of various 
countries as to whether the UK should put forth 
an explicit guarantee against attacking sea-
borne trade during conflict. However, British 
strategists like Julian Corbett were of the 
opinion that such an outright exemption took 
away an important tool from British forces. They 
opined that such attacks or the threat of such 
attacks helped British forces secure concessions 
from adversaries (deterrence by punishment) 
while at the same time protecting (deterrence 
by denial) the British Isles from attacks from 
the sea.9 
During the Second World War something 
similar took place. Both the British and the 
Germany Air Forces avoided targeting cities. 
While the German bombers targeted the Royal 
Air Force (RAF) bases and avoided cities, the 
British did likewise.  
Soon after the use of nuclear weapons by 
the US in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Bernard 
Brodie writing in The Absolute Weapon, penned 
what has since become one of the oft repeated 
quotes when discussing nuclear weapons and 
deterrence. Brodie wrote, “Thus far the chief 
purpose of our military establishment has been 
to win wars. From now on its chief purpose 
must be to avert them. It can have almost no 
other useful purpose.”10
The above statement by Bernard Brodie 
in essence captures the deterrent value of 
the nuclear weapon especially in view of its 
destructive potential. Though there has been 
a difference of opinion as to whether – if at 
all – it was the nuclear explosions which led 
to the Japanese surrender11; there can be no 
disagreement on the fact that the nuclear 
weapon’s destructive potential dwarfed that of 
all weapons used in prior wars. The enormous 
‘pain’ or even the threat of inflicting such ‘pain’ 
on an adversary laid the foundations of what 
Glenn Snyder described in his book Deterrence 
and Defence as ‘deterrence by punishment.’
Nuclear deterrence in the Cold War came 
into play with the Soviet acquisition of the 
nuclear weapon. The early dangers seen in the 
Korean War resulted in both the US and Soviet 
Union working towards avoiding a nuclear 
holocaust. However, both blocs built up an 
arsenal comprising of thousands of nuclear 
weapons. Partly, the race to build larger weapons 
in greater numbers was fuelled by the fear in 
the West, that communist countries like the 
8 George P. Shultz, Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, Eds. Deterrence: Its Past and Future, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2011, pg. 11.
9 Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Naval Strategy, London: Longmans, pg. 99 cited in George P. Shultz, Sidney D. 
Drell and James E. Goodby, Eds. Deterrence: Its Past and Future, California: Stanford University Press, 2011, pp. 
5-6. 
10 Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon, New York: Harcourt, 1946, pg. 76.
11 Ward Wilson, Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013; Ward Wilson, “The 
Bomb Didn’t Beat Japan … Stalin Did,” Foreign Policy, May 29, 2013, available at, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2013/05/29/the_bomb_didnt_beat_japan_nuclear_world_war_ii?page=full
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Soviet Union and China had higher thresholds 
of absorbing pain and human loss which 
necessitated threatening them with massive 
nuclear strikes so as to maintain deterrence.
In subsequent years, despite serious 
conflicts like the 1961 Berlin Blockade and 
the resultant airlift; the 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis and the 1974 Yom Kippur War and the 
possibility of escalation which they held; 
nuclear Armageddon was averted. The fact 
that nuclear weapons were not used in these 
conflicts resulted in the strengthening of the 
belief that these weapons and their immense 
destructive potential contributed to stability. 
As a result, theorists studying nuclear 
deterrence outlined a slew of theories ranging 
from existential deterrence to recessed 
deterrence to classical deterrence to structural 
deterrence. It is outside the scope of this report 
to delve in detail into each of these theories 
and their strengths and weaknesses. There 
are several scholars like Lawrence Freedman, 
Thomas Schelling, Glenn Snyder among others 
who have delved into these issues with greater 
detail and competence.12
Given that Pakistan is seeking to introduce 
nuclear weapons into the sub-continent, it 
would be worth the while to look back at 
American and Soviet experiences from that 
era. During the Cold War, the US and the 
Soviet Union possessed the largest number 
of tactical nuclear weapons. At its height, the 
US and Russia possessed about 11,500 and 
22,000 tactical nuclear weapons respectively. 
These numbers have reduced by several factors 
of magnitude to a situation where the US is 
believed to possess about 1,000 weapons as 
opposed to the Russian nuclear stockpile which 
currently includes somewhere between 2,000 
to 8,000 tactical weapons.
However, tactical weapons posed a lot 
of problems that ranged from maintaining 
command and control over pre-delegated 
weapons, doctrinal to force structure for 
employing these weapons to deter the Warsaw 
Pact’s conventional might.13 Thus, both India 
and Pakistan would do well if they remember 
and learn from the past and thus don’t make the 
same mistakes the Cold Warriors made. 
For purposes of this report, the question 
that is critical is how nuclear deterrence has 
operated between India and Pakistan; and 
in this larger context, how one perceives the 
Pakistani short range ‘nuclear-capable’ missile 
the NASR/Hatf-IX.
NucleaR deteRReNce: INdIa aNd 
PakIStaN
The 1998 nuclear tests by India and 
Pakistan resulted in the overt nuclearisation 
of the Indo-Pak relationship. This is analysed 
briefly in the subsequent paragraphs beginning 
12 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, UK: Palgrave, 2003; Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence, Lon-
don: Polity Press, 2004; George Quester, The Future of Nuclear Deterrence, Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1986; 
Patrick Morgan, Deterrence Now, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and 
Defence: Towards A Theory of National Security, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961; Thomas Schelling, 
Arms and Influence, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
13 For an excellent analysis of US and NATO experiences with Tactical Nuclear Weapons see, David Smith, “The US 
Experience with Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Lessons for South Asia,” March 4, 2013, Washington: Stimson Center, 
available at http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/David_Smith_Tactical_Nuclear_Weapons.
pdf
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with a succinct analysis of their nuclear policies 
and doctrines; followed up with the dynamics 
during the 1999 Kargil War and 2001-02 crisis 
involving mobilisation of their militaries along 
the Indo-Pak border.
India was first off the block with the 
release of its draft nuclear doctrine which 
was authored by the Indian National Security 
Advisory Board (NSAB) and released in 
August 1999 by the then National Security 
Advisor, Mr. Brajesh Mishra. The salient 
points of this document were an unqualified 
assurance of no-first use, pursuit of a ‘credible 
minimum’ deterrent, and the threat of punitive 
retaliation inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ 
against the aggressor in case of use of nuclear 
weapons against India. Given the no-first use 
(NFU) policy, the doctrine placed emphasis 
on the survivability of the Indian nuclear 
forces thereby outlining the need to build a 
triad combined by building in redundancy 
into systems, use of mobility, dispersion and 
deception.14 
This was followed up by widespread 
public debate and the release of a statement 
in January 2003 following a Cabinet 
Committee on Security (CCS) meeting which 
‘reviewed the progress in operationalising 
India’s nuclear doctrine.’15 Though it is not 
clear when the doctrine was formally adopted 
by the Indian government, the January 2003 
statement is significant because it is the only 
official statement of India’s nuclear doctrine 
and for the changes in policy it indicated 
therein vis-a-vis the August 1999 NSAB draft. 
The January 2003 press release reiterates 
the no-first use (NFU) policy and the pursuit 
and maintenance of a credible minimum 
deterrent. However, it qualifies the NFU (as 
opposed to the NSAB draft which did not have 
any qualifiers) by adding that India retains 
the right to use the nuclear “in the event 
of a major attack against India, or Indian 
forces anywhere, by biological or chemical 
weapons.”16 
The second major departure was the 
addition of the word ‘massive’ while assuring 
infliction of unacceptable damage in case of 
a nuclear attack against India. The idea of 
‘massive retaliation’ was something which was 
absent in the 1999 NSAB draft doctrine which 
had only spoken of ‘punitive’ retaliation. The 
third change in the January 2003 statement 
relates to India’s commitment in relation to 
states which did not possess nuclear weapons. 
The August 1999 draft doctrine stated that 
India “will not resort to the use or threat of 
use of nuclear weapons against States which 
do not possess nuclear weapons, or are 
not aligned with nuclear weapon powers.” 
However, the January 2003 press release 
provides an assurance of non-use of nuclear 
14 “Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine”, Ministry of External Affairs, Au-
gust 17, 1999, available at http://www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18916/Draft+Report+of+National+Se
curity+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine
15 “Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Press Infor-
mation Bureau, January 4, 2003, available at http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/
r040120033.html
16 Pakistani scholars have cited the above qualifier as a reason why Pakistan cannot believe in the credibility of the 
Indian no-first use (NFU) declaration. See Zafar Iqbal Cheema, “Pakistan,” in Hans Born, Bates Gill and Heiner 
Hanggi, Eds., Governing the Bomb: Civilian Control and Democratic Accountability of Nuclear Weapons, Oxford: 
SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 2010, pg 202, fn. 33.
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weapons only against non-nuclear weapon 
states.17 
Unlike India, Pakistan has never released 
a formal official statement outlining its nuclear 
doctrine. Many believe this to be the result 
of the fact that ambiguity provides Pakistan 
greater leeway. This is because Islamabad 
perceives itself to be at a disadvantage vis-a-
vis India in terms of its physical size (lack of 
strategic depth) and asymmetry in conventional 
military strength. Pakistan fears that if it clearly 
spells out its thresholds, India could use it to 
its advantage by going up-to such a ‘red line’ 
and no further; thereby weakening Pakistan’s 
rationale to threaten use of nuclear weapons. 
This might especially be the case when say New 
Delhi is responding to a major terror strike by 
Pakistan-backed terrorist groups. 
However, despite never putting out a 
formal document outlining its nuclear doctrine, 
Pakistan leaders who are associated with its 
nuclear programme have released several 
important statements, authoring articles or 
giving media interviews. While this cannot 
be taken as official policy, these statements 
provide the broad contours while at the same 
time remaining ambiguous about the specifics 
of Islamabad’s nuclear policy. Such statements 
though not official statements, can be taken 
as being indicative of official policy especially 
when the individuals making such statements 
are known to be involved in the nuclear policy 
and decision-making apparatus in Islamabad. 
Pakistan has many a times re-emphasised 
its goal of achieving a minimum credible 
deterrent capability. In 1999, General Pervez 
Musharraf stated that while Pakistan was not 
concerned with a mathematical ratio and 
proportion, Islamabad “would retain enough 
missile capacity to reach anywhere in India 
and destroy a few cities, if required.”18 Lt. 
Gen. Khalid Kidwai, head of Pakistan’s SPD 
has outlined four salient features of Pakistan’s 
nuclear policy. These were: first, deterrence of 
all forms of external aggression; second, ability 
to deter a counter-strike against strategic assets; 
third, stabilisation of strategic deterrence 
in South Asia; and fourth conventional and 
strategic deterrence methods.19 
Another statement - indicative of Pakistan’s 
nuclear policy - was made by Lt. Gen. Khalid 
Kidwai while interacting with an Italian based 
arms control organisation, Landau Network. 
Lt Gen Kidwai hinted at Pakistan’s nuclear 
thresholds when he stated “Pakistani nuclear 
weapons will be used, only “if the very existence 
of Pakistan as a state is at stake.” He stated that 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are aimed solely at 
India and if deterrence fails Pakistan will use 
nuclear weapons if, “India attacks Pakistan and 
conquers a large part of its territory (space 
threshold); India destroys a large part either of 
17 Rajesh Rajagopalan has written about the possible reasons for such changes in Indian nuclear doctrine when one 
compares the August 1999 NSAB draft and the January 2003 press release. Apart from criticism that the NFU 
pledge was not enough to deter potential threats (in light of the Parliament attacks), Rajagopalan also ponders 
whether the government has seriously pondered of the implications of the contradictions thrown up by the two 
statements. See, Rajesh Rajagopalan, “India’s Nuclear Policy”, in Major Powers’ Nuclear Policies and International 
Order in the 21st Century, Tokyo: National Institute of Defence Studies, 2010, pp. 98-101.
18 Cited in John Cherian, “The Arms Race,” Frontline, Vol.16, Issue 9, April 24 - May 7, 1999, available at http://
www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1609/16090230.htm
19 “Pakistan’s Evolution as a Nuclear Weapons State,” Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai’s, November 1, 2006, Naval Postgradu-
ate School, Monterey, available at http://www.nps.edu/academics/centers/ccc/news/kidwaiNov06.html
9NatioNal iNstitute of advaNced studies
its land or air forces (military threshold); India 
proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan 
(economic strangling); India pushes Pakistan 
into political destabilisation or creates a large 
scale internal subversion in Pakistan (domestic 
destabilisation).”20
Michael Krepon has identified ‘four main 
pillars’ of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. These 
are firstly, its India-specific nature; second, 
adoption of a credible, minimal deterrent policy; 
third, that the requirements of such a deterrent 
are dynamic and not fixed; and fourth, first-
use of its nuclear deterrent given its military 
asymmetry versus India.21 
Since the 1998 nuclear tests and the overt 
nuclearisation of the Indian sub-continent, 
Pakistan’s nuclear strategy has been to use its 
nuclear deterrent to counter the asymmetric 
advantage that India enjoys in conventional 
military terms. Therefore, Pakistan views and 
uses its nuclear weapons to deter a conventional 
military onslaught by India. This is different 
from the Indian view which perceives nuclear 
weapons as political weapons, which would 
prevent a nuclear attack on India by its 
adversaries. 
Elements of Pakistan’s nuclear thinking 
have been seen in the past too. In particular 
during the 1986-87 Brasstacks Crisis and during 
the 1990 Kashmir crisis, Pakistan employed 
its covert nuclear capability to signal possible 
escalation of the conflict in order to involve 
the international community, resulting in de-
escalation of the conflict.22 Pakistan therefore 
can be seen to be using its nuclear deterrent 
to threaten escalation of the conflict to higher 
levels of ‘all-out war’ and therefore prevent 
India from using its conventional might to its 
advantage. In light of Pakistan’s support for 
cross-border terrorism and its complicity in 
terror attacks against India, such a strategy is 
advantageous to Pakistan.23
20 Nuclear safety, nuclear stability and nuclear strategy in Pakistan, Landau Network, Italy, January 14, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.pugwash.org/september11/pakistan-nuclear.htm
21 Michael Krepon, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Stability,” Washington, Stimson Center, Decem-
ber 10, 2012, available at http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Krepon_-_Pakistan_Nuclear_
Strategy_and_Deterrence_Stability.pdf
22 Paul Kapur questions the popular understanding of the Brasstacks crisis by posing the question whether it was 
preventive or pre-emptive in nature. See Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent, pp. 85-91. With regard to the 1990 
Kashmir Crisis, Seymour Hersh writing in The New Yorker states that US intervention was a result of intelligence 
provided by American agencies which pointed to the possibility that Pakistan was moving its missiles and moving 
towards assembling a nuclear weapon. See Seymour Hersh, “On the Nuclear Edge,” The New Yorker, March 29, 
1993, pp. 56-73. However, both Paul Kapur and Bajpai et al. conclude that India was not seriously considering any 
hostile activity. Therefore, conclude that stating that Pakistan’s covert nuclear capability deterred India would be 
a leap. See, Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia, New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 108-113.  The lack of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent having influence Indian reac-
tions is also made by Kanti Bajpai, et al Ed. Brasstack and Beyond: Perceptions and Management of Crisis in South 
Asia, Delhi: Manohar, 1997, p.40.
23 Such behaviour has been described using Cold War terminology as ‘stability-instability’ paradox. Varun Sahni and 
Paul Kapur provide insightful analysis of whether or not the stability-instability paradox is relevant in the Indian 
sub-continent. See, Varun Sahni, “The Stability-Instability Paradox: A Less than Perfect Explanation,” in E. Srid-
haran Ed., The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations, New Delhi : 
Routledge, pp. 185-207; Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent, New Delhi: Oxford, pp. 169-184; Paul Kapur, “Revision-
ist Ambitions, Conventional Capabilities, and Nuclear Instability: Why Nuclear South Asia is Not Like Cold War 
Europe,” in Scott Sagan Ed., Inside Nuclear South Asia, New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, pp. 184-218.
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Post-1998, there have been two instances 
where the deterrence stability between India 
and Pakistan has been tested. The first occurred 
as a result of Pakistan’s misadventure in Kargil 
and the second was the border mobilisation 
by both countries in response to the terrorist 
strikes on the Indian Parliament. 
The 1999 Kargil Conflict
Due to its nuclear capability, Pakistan felt 
that it could wage a limited battle without 
the war escalating to the extent that it did.24 
This was the underlying assumption behind 
the Kargil incursions. The architect of Kargil, 
then Pakistani Army Chief Pervez Musharraf’s 
statement to the graduating class at the Pakistan 
Military Academy in April 1999 buttresses the 
existence of a belief in Islamabad that Pakistan’s 
nuclear deterrence has provided it with a cover 
for conventional war. 
“Our efforts to acquire a viable defensive 
force both in the conventional and also, by grace 
of Allah, in the nuclear and missile mode are to 
guarantee peace and security through potent 
deterrence ... This, however, does not mean 
that conventional war has become obsolete. In 
fact conventional war will still remain the mode 
of conflict in any future conflagration with our 
traditional enemy.”25
This goes back to the argument that Scott 
Sagan and other organisation theorists make; 
which is that organisational interests and 
biases are an important factor in understanding 
Pakistan’s nuclear behaviour. Scott Sagan states, 
“Any government in Islamabad would be likely 
to have a first-use doctrine, but the specific 
details of Pakistani nuclear doctrine reflect 
common organisational biases stemming from 
the central role of the professional military in 
making policy and the weak institutional checks 
and balances on its authority over nuclear 
matters.”26 
Though, there were many who agreed with 
the rationale underlying the gambit Musharraf 
was taking, it is interesting and somewhat 
encouraging to note that the operations were 
not received equally well across the Pakistani 
military. There seem to have been individuals 
who criticised the operation on the basis that 
it did not take into account the wider military, 
diplomatic and strategic ramifications of 
the entire operation. One such individual is 
Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail, who was then 
Pakistan Air Force director of operations.27 
However, it is not clear whether such a feeling 
was an isolated one or whether it remains 
more widespread within the Pakistani security 
forces. However, given the fact that the 
Pakistani Air Force was kept out of the decision 
making loop during Kargil and was later called 
on to provide support to Pakistani forces; 
one suspects inter-services rivalry might have 
contributed to the sentiments expressed by Air 
Commodore Tufail.
24 Interview with the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, cited in Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008, pg. 120.
25 Musharraf’s speech cited in Scott Sagan, “Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” in Scott Sagan Ed. 
Inside Nuclear South Asia, New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2011, pp. 229-230.
26 Scott Sagan, “Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” in Scott Sagan Ed. Inside Nuclear South Asia, 
New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2011, pg 220.
27 Scott Sagan, “Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” in Scott Sagan Ed. Inside Nuclear South Asia, 
New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2011, pg 231.
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Despite opinions being expressed to the 
contrary by Pakistani military officers, the 
take-away from the Kargil conflict was the fact 
that India would respond with military force - 
though it might be limited in scope - in case its 
territory was occupied. Though India did not 
expand its scope of operations horizontally and 
decided against opening other fronts; it is clear 
that the option was discussed and it had been 
decided for the time being to continue fighting 
under the unfavourable conditions and absorb 
the mounting casualties. However, the decision 
to open another front and expand the conflict 
remained on the table and might have been 
exercised in case the conflict had gotten worse 
for India.28  
Following the Kargil conflict, the chief of 
Pakistan’s Strategic Planning Division (SPD), Lt. 
Gen. Khalid Kidwai, speaking to representatives 
of Landau Network, an Italian arms control 
organisation, outlined the four red lines or 
thresholds of space, military, economic and 
domestic destabilisation.29 As these have been 
outlined earlier, these will not be repeated again 
at this point. However, these thresholds do raise 
the question of whether the Pakistani nuclear 
planners have limited options of responding to 
nuclear threats. Probably, Pakistanis are using 
the NASR to indicate such an option which falls 
between massive and suicidal retaliation and 
doing nothing. 
The 2001-02 Crisis
On December 13, 2001 Pakistan-backed 
terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) attacked the Indian 
Parliament. In response, India decided it 
had to compel Pakistan to change its tactic 
of supporting terrorist groups who carry out 
attacks against India based on the belief that 
the Pakistan’s nuclear capability would deter 
India from carrying out conventional strikes. 
To this end, Indian leaders launched the 
largest ever mobilisation of its forces since the 
1971 War with Pakistan on December 18, 2001. 
Operation Parakram, as the mobilisation was 
termed, resulted in the massing of 500,000 
Indian troops along the Line of Control (LoC) 
and the International border (IB) that India 
and Pakistan share. Between December 2001 
and October 2002 when India and Pakistan 
finally decided to drawdown their troops from 
the LoC and the IB, the situation was fairly 
tense, reaching its possible peak in May 2002 
following a major terrorist attack on an Indian 
Army camp at Kaluchak in Jammu. 
Under international (in particular, 
American) pressure, Pakistan took some steps to 
mollify India. In January 2002, Pakistan banned 
the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-
Mohammed (JeM) followed by the March 2002 
statement by President Musharraf on national 
television promising that Pakistani territory 
would not be allowed to be used as a launching 
ground for terrorism attacks against India. 
However, Pakistan’s claim that it was clamping 
down on the terror groups was soon blown to 
smithereens. On May 14, 2002 Pakistan-backed 
terror groups JeM and LeT attacked an Indian 
Army camp at Kaluchak in Jammu. The attack 
28 Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia, New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2008, pg. 128-30.
29 Nuclear safety, nuclear stability and nuclear strategy in Pakistan, Landau Network, Italy, January 14, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.pugwash.org/september11/pakistan-nuclear.htm
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resulted in thirty-six casualties with family 
members of Indian army personnel among the 
deceased. The Indian leadership lashed out 
following the attack with Indian Prime Minister 
Atal Behari Vajpayee - during a visit to the 
region - asking the Indian soldiers to be ready 
for a “decisive battle” against Pakistan.30 
However, following American pressure, 
President Musharraf stated in early June 
2002 that Pakistan would end infiltration 
‘permanently.’ US Deputy Secretary of State, 
Richard Armitage who squeezed this promised 
out of Musharraf then visited New Delhi 
assuring Indian leaders that Musharraf would 
keep his word. The mobilisation was finally 
withdrawn by India and Pakistan beginning 
October 2002, under international pressure and 
following assurances by Pakistan that it would 
act against the terror groups.
However, despite claims by several 
Indian leaders to the contrary, critics term 
Operation Parakram as “the most ill conceived 
manoeuvre in Indian military history.” Former 
Army Chief, Shankar Roychoudhry, describes 
Operation Parakram as a “pointless gesture” 
which compromised Indian credibility greatly.31 
Apart from the slowing down of cross-border 
infiltration, and a few hollow Pakistani promises, 
India did not gain much by such a large military 
mobilisation which according to some estimates 
cost somewhere between US$ 400 million to 
US$ 1 billion. The Pakistani promises as India 
realised did not mean much as highlighted by 
the attack on the Kalachuk army camp even 
during the military mobilisation. 
Different points of view on any such major 
decision are in the natural course of things. 
Critics point out that given India’s decision 
not to move beyond mobilising its forces on 
the border, Pakistan came out of the crisis 
with its belief strengthened that its nuclear 
capability had deterred India from launching 
a conventional attack. However, despite the 
economic cost that India had to bear, it is 
equally important to note that because of its 
worse off economic condition, the mobilisation 
would have been dearer for Pakistan. Another 
lesson, India sought to convey to Pakistan was 
its resolve to respond to a terrorist attack. India 
wanted to convey a signal to Pakistan that it did 
not buy the Pakistani threat that a conventional 
crisis would get escalated to the nuclear realm. 
In fact, the Indian Army chief during the 
Kargil conflict, General VP Malik captures the 
Indian position well when he states, “All-out 
conventional war, No. Limited conventional 
war, Yes.”32 
Thus, Indian responses during both the 
1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001-02 crisis can 
thus be seen as New Delhi’s attempt to test 
Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. The two crises 
provide valuable insight into the different 
understanding of nuclear deterrence prevalent 
in both countries which holds much value 
for the currently unfolding situation with the 
introduction of NASR. 
For Pakistan, not much changed with 
the overt nuclearisation of the sub-continent. 
30 Sarah Left, “Indian PM calls for ‘decisive battle’ over Kashmir,” The Guardian, May 22, 2002, available at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/may/22/kashmir.india
31 Praveen Swami and Gen. Roychoudhry as quoted by Kapur in Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008, pg. 136.
32 Cited in Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent, p. 137.
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Islamabad continues to be worried about 
India’s conventional military strength and its 
smaller physical size thereby strengthening its 
concern of lack of strategic depth. These twin 
factors were very important in its decision 
making calculus and in fashioning its view of 
nuclear weapons and deterrence. It is crucial 
to note the telling that Pakistan went ahead 
with Kargil despite both countries having gone 
nuclear in May 1998. This strengthens the 
argument that Islamabad views its nuclear 
deterrent as a counter to its conventional 
military asymmetry vis-a-vis India; thereby 
providing Islamabad with the space to carry 
out Kargil type operations as it could threaten 
escalation of the spectrum of conflict to the 
nuclear realm. 
The 2001 attack by the Pakistan-supported 
terror groups which resulted in the largest ever 
military mobilisation by India and the May 
2002 Kaluchak attack during the mobilisation 
affirmed Pakistan’s understanding that its 
nuclear deterrent provided the space to continue 
with its policy of supporting terrorist groups. 
However, it is important to note India’s 
reactions in both the situations. Indian 
response to Pakistani incursions in Kargil 
points out that - despite the nuclear backdrop 
- India will act if its territory was occupied. 
Similarly, Indian response to the 2001 terrorist 
attacks also indicates to the likelihood that 
there is an Indian threshold of suffering when 
it comes to terror attacks by Pak-supported 
groups. Clearly, the 2001 attacks on the 
Parliament crossed that threshold.33 Thus 
despite deciding not to cross into Pakistan, 
India does have options to make life difficult 
and costly for the Pakistani state, if it decides 
not to do a rethink on its current policy of 
supporting terrorist groups in carrying out 
attacks against Pakistan. 
INdIa uNveIlS tHe ‘cold StaRt’
In April 2004 the Indian Army unveiled 
its new military doctrine which has popularly 
been termed as ‘Cold Start’ given its attempt 
to reduce the mobilisation time.34 The new 
military doctrine was seen as indicative of 
India’s willingness to modify its traditionally 
defensive orientation to conflicts/wars and 
undertake a more pro-active and nimbler 
stance by launching limited wars in an NBC 
environment.  The doctrine also addressed 
the issue of the lack of an element of surprise 
during Operation Parakram which was a result 
of the fact that it took about three weeks for 
the three Indian strike corps to reach the 
border from their peacetime bases in the 
Indian hinterland.35 Swiftness in mobilisation 
to respond to an emerging situation was one 
of the most important lessons India had learnt 
from 2001-02 crisis. 
The primary objective of the doctrine is 
to launch a swift, conventional, limited strike 
against Pakistan in response to say another 
terrorist strike like the 2001 attack on the 
33 One could debate on what this threshold is and why the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks did not qualify for a mili-
tary response from India. Here it is important to understand that this debate goes to the heart of how India and 
Pakistan view nuclear deterrence differently. However, this is beyond the scope of this study.
34 Indian Army Doctrine, October 2004, Headquarters Army Training Command - Indian Army, Shimla, available 
at ids.nic.in/Indian%20Army%20Doctrine/indianarmydoctrine_1.doc
35 Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?: Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” International Secu-
rity, Vo. 32, No. 3, Winter 2007/08, pp. 158-190.
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Parliament. The crux of the doctrine and 
the reorganised force structure has been the 
necessity for swift and decisive action against 
Pakistan, and the need to fulfil the limited 
military objectives before the international 
community could intervene. The mobilisation 
and manoeuvre phases would be characterised 
by speed and surprise. One of the reasons for 
adopting the CSD is also to deny Islamabad 
the opportunity to involve the international 
community and thereby forestall Indian moves 
as it has been doing in the past.  
The operationalisation of the doctrine 
entails a move away from three massive strike-
corps to eight division sized ‘integrated battle 
groups’ (IBGs) which would launch “offensive 
operations to a shallow depth (30-40 miles), 
to capture a long swath of territory almost all 
along the international boundary” with close 
air and naval support within 72-96 hours.36 
The captured strip of land can be used as a 
“bargaining chip” to pressurise Pakistan to 
recant its support to terrorist networks. Post-
initial operations, the strike corps (one or 
more), would exploit the achievements without 
crossing Pakistan’s ambiguous nuclear red 
lines.37 Largely, CSD can be considered as a 
“form of flexible response, a serious effort at 
thinking through the prerequisites of limited 
war under the nuclear shadow”.38 
PakIStaN’S coNceRNS about INdIa’S 
cold StaRt doctRINe
Pakistan has been concerned about India’s 
new military doctrine since it was unveiled in 
2004. One of the major concerns in Islamabad 
was the fact that the new doctrine took away 
Pakistan’s rationale of issuing the threat of the 
conventional war escalating into a nuclear war. 
As India was no longer fighting a conventional 
all out war, it arguably would be fighting below 
Pakistan’s nuclear ‘red-lines’. This unnerved 
Pakistan to no end. 
In addition to nullifying the nuclear shield 
Pakistan sought to use in order to counter India’s 
asymmetric military advantage; the plans to 
mobilise quickly also gave Pakistan lesser time 
to plan and operationalise its own response. 
As former Director-General ISI, Lt. General 
Asad Durani states, during usual Indo-Pakistan 
military conflicts/wars leading to complete 
mobilisation, Pakistan forces would have 
almost 4-6 week to prepare for the engagement 
and undertake a rational “assessment of the 
adversary’s likely war plans.” However, with the 
launch of the CSD, Pakistan would have little 
time to react and operationalise their military 
plans to suit India’s swiftness.39
Another Pakistani concern emanates from 
its smaller physical size and it’s perceived lack 
of strategic depth. Analysts have averred that 
36 Gurmeet Kanwal, India’s Cold Start Doctrine and Strategic Stability, IDSA Comment, June 1, 2010, available 
at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiasColdStartDoctrineandStrategicStability_gkanwal_010610; Walter C. 
Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?: Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” International Security, 32(3), 
Winter 2007/08, pp. 164.
37 Kanwal, India’s Cold Start Doctrine and Strategic Stability.
38 Shashank Joshi, India’s Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn, Journal of Strategic Studies, 2013, available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2013.766598.
39 Workshop Report, Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine and its Implications for Strategic Stability in South Asia, 
20th-22nd July 2010, available at www.sassi.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Conference-Report.pdf.
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under the Cold Start, India’s goal would be to 
make shallow territorial gains, 50-80kms deep 
that could be used as post-conflict bargaining 
chips.40 Owing to Pakistan’s geographical 
makeup and limited strategic depth, major 
civilian and industrial centres near the Line 
of Control would get engulfed in the range 
stipulated in the doctrine. Following is the strip 
of area as specified a Pakistani scholar, Sania 
Abdullah, which remains at stake. 
Figure 1: Depiction of Pakistan’s possible 
Red-line41
Given that India’s IBGs are likely to be 
provided with close air support, Pakistan is 
also concerned about the Indian Air Force’s 
numerical and qualitative strength as compared 
to Pakistani Air Force.42 Pakistani scholar Zafar 
Nawaz also points to the difficulty Pakistan 
will face given Pakistani intelligence agencies’ 
“limited reconnaissance assets to monitor the 
status of all the eight IBGs,” which would be 
essential to counter CSD’s surprise element.43 
As seen from the above discussion, 
Pakistan sees its nuclear weapons primarily as 
a deterrent to a conventional military attack by 
India. This is opposed to Indian (and general) 
thinking about nuclear weapons, which are 
seen as political weapons and a deterrent 
against nuclear attack by one’s adversary. 
Given Pakistan’s fears emanating from India’s 
2004 military doctrine, Pakistan has sought to 
use to NASR to signal a further lowering of 
its nuclear threshold in order to prevent any 
limited conventional military strike by India. 
Pakistan is seen to be exploring the space 
for a flexible response which falls between a 
massive response and doing nothing. 
However the danger is such a strategy is 
two-fold. First, India is equipped to fight in 
an NBC environment as outlined in the Indian 
Army’s 2004 military doctrine and subsequent 
pronouncements. Secondly, India’s nuclear 
doctrine, does not differentiate between a 
tactical and strategic nuclear weapon or such 
use. Indian response to any use of a nuclear 
weapon by Pakistan will be a retaliation which 
is massive and designed to inflict unacceptable 
damage on Pakistan. Thus, the space that 
Islamabad is seeking to explore by way of NASR 
just does not exist.
40 Firdaus Ahmed, “The Calculus of ‘Cold Start’,” India Together, May 2004, available at http://www.indiatogether.
org/2004/may/fah-coldstart.htm.
41 Sania Abdullah, “Cold Start in Strategic Calculus,” IPRI Journal, 12(1), Winter 2012, pg, 13, available at http://
ipripak.org/journal/winter2012/Article%201.pdf.
42 Abdullah, Cold Start in Strategic Calculus.
43 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Cold Start Assumptions: Critical Analysis”, paper presented at Workshop on Indian Military’s 
Cold Start Doctrine and its Implications for Strategic Stability in South Asia, Islamabad, 20th-22nd July 2010, 
available at www.sassi.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Conference-Report.pdf.
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NaSR/Hatf-IX: a tecHNIcal aNalySIS
The Pakistani short range surface to 
surface multi tube ballistic missile called 
Hatf-IX (NASR) has been tested thrice on 
April 19, 2011, May 29, 2012 and February 
11, 201344  The NASR with a range of 60 km 
carries is claimed to carry “nuclear warheads of 
appropriate yield with high accuracy, shoot and 
scoot attributes.” The discernible difference is 
a two-tube launcher was employed for the first 
flight, whereas a 4-tube launcher was employed 
for the second flight. The images from the ISPR 
press releases are shown in Figure 2.
The carrier vehicle for the missile is said to 
be AR1A/A100-E multiple launch rocket system 
(MLRS), procured by Pakistan from China. The 
A100-E artillery rocket system has 10 launching 
tubes for 300 mm diameter rockets of nominal 
length 7.3 m and nominal weight of 840 kg. It is 
claimed by certain sources that Pakistan procured 
a battalion (36 numbers) of this system from 
China for initial evaluation and is likely to order 
further numbers.45 Comparison of the images 
(Figure 3) of the NASR carrier vehicle with A100-E 
does show close resemblance. As the calibre of the 
rockets on A100-E is 300 mm researchers have 
assumed the NASR diameter also to be 300 mm. 
Pakistan is certainly capable of building a 
missile like the NASR, but the crucial question 
concerns Islamabad’s capability to field a 
miniaturised nuclear weapon system on the 
NASR. 
deteRmININg tHe NaSR’S dImeNSIoNS
Images and video footage of the NASR 
missile emerging from the launcher tube at 
44 Press Release No. PR94/2011-ISPR, Rawalpindi-April 19, 2011,  http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-
press_release&date=2011/4/19 accessed 19 January 2013; Press Release No. PR130/2012-ISPR, Rawalpindi-
May 29, 2012, http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2012/5/29 accessed 25 Janu-
ary 2013.
45 “AR1A: Multiple launch rocket system,” Military Today, available at http://www.military-today.com/artillery/
ar1a.htm.
Figure 2: NASR/Hatf-IX Flight test images
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an angle of 40o-45o to the horizontal similar 
to Figure 2 are available. The TEL dimensions 
therefore hold the clue for determining the 
missile dimensions. The Chinese version of 
the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) 
equivalent to the Russian Smerch system is 
referred to as A-100. The Chinese modified 
it and sold the AR1A also referred to as the 
A100-E to Pakistan. The A100-E chassis with 
the modified launching tube system is adapted 
for launching the NASR missile. The obvious 
similarity between the two carrier vehicles can 
Figure 3: A100-E MLRS (left) and NASR MLRS (right)
Figure 4: NASR emerging from the launch tube Figure 5: NASR aft end view
be seen in Figure 3.46 
Similarities include the number of axles, 
the cabin, cabin mounting steps, front bumper, 
rear cabin ladder/ladder location and the box 
just ahead of the 3rd axle. The Smerch carrier 
was fitted with MLRS for carrying/launching 
twelve missiles of 300 mm calibre. The Chinese 
A100-E system given to Pakistan featured ten 
missiles of 300 mm calibre. Based on this, it 
appears that Zahir Kazmi has concluded the 
NASR’s diameter to be 300 mm.47 What Pakistan 
has done is to use the A100-E TEL chassis but 
46 Images taken from: “AR1A: Multiple launch rocket system,” Military Today, available at http://www.military-to-
day.com/artillery/ar1a.htm and “Hatf IX Nasr Missile Tested by Pakistan,” Pakistan Defence, available at http://
www.defence.pk/forums/pakistan-strategic-forces/183325-hatf-ix-nasr-missile-tested-pakistan-6.html.
47 Zahir Kazmi, “SRBMs, Deterrence and Regional Stability South Asia: A case study of NASR and Prahar,” Regional 
Studies, 30(4), Autumn 2012, p. 73.
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totally replaced the multi-launch tubes, initially 
with a two tube system and subsequently with 
a 4 tube system as shown in Figures 4 and 
5. It should be possible to guess the missile 
dimensions using these images and the known 
dimensions. An examination of figures 4 and 5 
indicates that:
	The missile is slender (most missiles of 
this class can be expected to be so) and 
is fin stabilised
	The launch barrel is square in shape 
	The missile is loaded into the tube with 
the fins fitting diagonally (at 45
o
)
	There must be launch rails inside the 
tube (not visible in figure 4). 
	The launch angle is close to 40
o
 
The dimensions and other features of the 
AR 1A/A100-E TEL are indicated in Table 1.
Table 1: Dimensions and other details 











Vertical Step 0.6 m
Trench 2 m
Fording 1.1 m
The rear axle and the end of the vehicle 
are covered by the missile exhaust gases 
and hence is not visible. Therefore using the 
known length of the vehicle for proportionately 
determining the missile length is not possible. 
Consequently, the possibility of arriving at the 
dimensions using the width of the vehicle was 
examined. Detailed dimensions of the WS 2500 
TEL49 in use by the Pakistani defence services 
are available. The width of the trailer is 3.05 m, 
close enough to the 3 m width of the A100-E 
shown in table 1. The wheel span for the WS 
2500 is known to be 2.375 m and the same span 
can be assumed for A100-E. A close up view of 
the aft potion of the missile, launcher tube and 
trailer is shown in Figure 6, from which some 
details can be gleaned. 
It can be seen that the side of the tube is 
in line with the fender centre line and it can 
therefore be assumed that the twin tubes with 
the gap between them have a width equal 
to the wheel base. This information is to be 
supplemented with additional data to get a 
handle on the missile dimensions. Figure 7 is 
a video grab50 taken from YouTube. From the 
image, the following information is evident:
	The tube cross section is square
	The launch rail is at the top inner surface 
of the tube
	The missile has forward canards to aid 
stability
	There are two channels on the tube 
sides. They may either carry electrical 
48 The MLRS details are sourced from “A-100: Multiple launch rocket system,” Military Today, available at http://
www.military-today.com/artillery/a100.htm.
49 Technical details of WS 2500 TEL available at http://trishulgroup.blogspot.in/2008_12_01_archive.html
50 Video available at “Pakistan Army Successfully Test Fires Nuclear Capable Hatf IX (NASR) - (29-05-2012)”, You-
Tube, available at video grab from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xI2qWVN0Tsc.
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Figure 6: NASR missile/A-100-E
Figure 7: View from the fore-end
Launch rail Launch rail Connection for missile ignition
wiring or may provide additional 
support to the missile in the tube.
	A connector on the outside wall at the 
right is also visible. This is for providing 
the firing current for initiating the 
missile launch.
Making allowances for the width of the 
trunnion mounting plate, for the thickness of 
the side wall and the gap between the tubes, the 
dimension of inside of the tube is estimated as 
766 mm. From figure 5, it can be seen that the 
missile body diameter is approximately equal 
to the fin semi-span, which means the diagonal 
of the tube section can be equally divided into 
three parts to represent the fins and the missile 
body. From this consideration, the missile 
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diameter is estimated to be 361 mm. 
From figure 5, the length to diameter ratio of 
the missile is estimated to be 15, from which 
the missile length is found to be 5416 
mm.  One joint is discernible just above the 
‘NASR’ logo and this is the connection between 
the missile power plant and the warhead. This 
joint is located 1600 mm from the nose tip. 
The finally derived dimensions of the missile 
are shown in figure 8.
IS NaSR NucleaR caPable? a 
tecHNIcal aNalySIS
A fairly well designed power plant of the 
dimensions shown in figure 7 can accommodate 
about 350 kg of composite solid propellant and 
can be expected to have a range in excess of 300 
km with a nominal payload of 100-150 kg. The 
fact that the missile seems to be designed for 
a lower range indicates the propellant loading 
must be much lower, perhaps in the region of 
75-100 kg. While this propellant quantity can 
in fact be housed in a smaller calibre motor, the 
choice of a larger diameter for the power plant 
is obviously dictated by other considerations. 
The minimum achievable size of the warhead 
appears to be the deciding factor for the 
diameter of the missile.
The question is to see, if a nuclear warhead 
can be fitted into the available dimension of 350 
mm diameter and 1600 mm length. A survey of 
tactical nuclear weapons fielded by the United 
States51 showed that low yield weapons can 
indeed be designed to fit into these dimensions 
as shown in Table 2 below: 
The NASR warhead section has been 
estimated to have a cylindrical section which 
is 940 mm long and a conical portion which 
is 660 mm long. It can be seen that with the 
exception of W-55 and W-79, all the warheads 
can fit within the NASR warhead dimensions. 
The questions that need to be pondered over are 
(a) has Pakistan miniaturised a weapon system 
to this level, (b) has it been tested and (c) in 
the absence of tests, how reliable is the weapon 
system. Most importantly, in the absence of 
Figure 8: NASR missile estimated dimensions
51 Thomas Cochran, William Arkin and Milton Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume 1: US Nuclear Forces and 
Capabilities, Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 1984 (Data compiled and collated by Dr. Arun Vishwana-
than, Assistant Professor, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore).
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demonstrated reliability, how confident will 
Pakistan be in fielding it?
In the May 1998 tests, Pakistan had 
tested only HEU based devices. There is wide 
discrepancy between the Pakistani claims 
of the weapon yield and the international 
estimates. In the interview after the tests, AQ 
Khan52 had claimed “four of the devices were 
small tactical weapons of low yield. Tipped 
on small missiles, they can be used in the 
battlefield against concentration of troops“. 
The international assessment of the yield 
from the Pakistani tests was 8-12 kT for the 
28 May shot and 4-6 kT for the 30 May shot. 
Even if we accept the AQ Khan statement on 
tactical weapons, we are not wiser on its size; 
the smallest ballistic missile tested, when 
AQ Khan made the statement was the Hatf-
1 which was 560 mm in diameter and had 









W-44 ASW warhead 349.25 642.62 77 10 kT
W-45 Warhead 292.1 685.8
68
500 T; 1, 5, 8, 10, 15 kT
158
W-48 Artillery Shell 155 845.82 53-58 72 T
W-54 Warhead 273.05 398.78 22-23 250 T
Mk-54 Warhead 273.05 447.04 22-24 10, 20 T
W-55 ASW 330.2 1000.76 213 Mid Kiloton Range
W-60 Warhead 330.2 508 52-68 Very low
W-74 Artillery Shell 155 NA  2 yields (both >100 T)
W-75 Artillery Shell 203 NA  >100 T
W-79 Artillery Shell 203.2 1117.6 90
Variable - 100 T to 1.1 kT (Mod 0), 0.8 Kt 
(Mod 1)
W-80-0 Warhead 299.72 797.56 131 Variable: 5 kT and 170-200 kT
W-80-1 Warhead 299.72 797.56 131 Variable: 5 kT and 150-170 kT
W-81 Warhead 342.9   2 - 4 kT
W-82 Artillery Shell 155 863.6 43 <2 kT
W-84 Warhead 330.2 863.6 175 Variable: 0.2 - 150 kT
W-85 Warhead 317.5 1066.8 399 Variable: 5 - 80 kT
a range of 80 km. If a weapon system had 
been designed for Hatf-1 as claimed by Khan, 
it would be too large to fit into the envelope 
available with NASR.
Further miniaturisation to fit into the 
NASR class of missiles can probably come with a 
Plutonium based linear implosion device. A linear 
implosion allows for a low density, elongated 
non-spherical (rugby ball shaped) mass to be 
compressed into a supercritical configuration 
without using symmetric implosion designs. 
This assembly is accomplished by embedding an 
elliptical shaped mass in a cylinder of explosive. 
The explosive is detonated on both ends, and an 
inert wave shaping device is required in front of 
the detonation points. Such a device is shown 
schematically in Figure 9.
Such a device requires larger quantity 
- almost double - of plutonium as opposed to 
52 “Interview with Abdul Qadeer Khan,” The News Islamabad, Saturday, May 30, 1998, available at http://nuclear-
weaponarchive.org/Pakistan/KhanInterview.html.
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the requirement in spherical compression. A 
Pakistani design of such a device can be expected 
to weigh at least 100 kg. In the United States, 
extensive experimentation was needed to 
create a workable form, but this design enables 
the use of Plutonium as well as Uranium. The 
HEU device will obviously be heavier. Pakistan 
can at best work on the explosive + detonator 
combination with surrogate material, which 
is not the same as testing with the actual 
material. In the end, what Pakistan will have is 
an untested device. 
PakIStaN’S fISSIle mateRIal PRoductIoN 
It is difficult to assess Pakistan’s weapon 
priorities and hence the fissile material 
production strategy. Pakistan has uranium 
deposits with rather poor concentration. Its 
first mine was at Bagalchore, which ceased 
production in 2000. The production is now 
from deposits at Nanganai and Taunsa near 
Dera Ghazi Khan using in situ leaching process. 
Nanganai started production in 1996 and 
Taunsa in 2002. The OECD/IAEA estimate 
shows uranium production in Pakistan at 23 
tonnes per annum till the year 2000 and 40 
tonnes per annum from 2002 onwards. Pakistan 
has enrichment facility at Kahuta and Plutonium 
processing reactors at Khushab. One 50 MWt 
reactor-Khushab 1 has been in production since 
1998. Khushab 2 may have become operational 
in 2010 and Khushab 3 may be ready in 2012. 
Khushab 4 is also being erected.  Using satellite 
imagery Tamara Patton53 has estimated the 
Khushab reactors capacity to be in the 40-90 
MWt range. 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme is 
mainly based on enriched uranium. The tests 
carried out by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May 1998 
were based on HEU and had yields of 11-12 kT 
and 4-6 kT respectively. There is no evidence of 
any Plutonium based tests at this. If one needs 
Figure 9: Linear Implosion Device
53 Tamara Patton “Combining Satellite Imagery and 3D Drawing Tools for Nonproliferation Analysis: A Case 
Study of Pakistan’s Khushab Plutonium Production Reactors,” Science & Global Security: The Technical Ba-
sis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, 20:2-3, 2012, pp. 117-140, available at 
10.1080/08929882.2012.719383.
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to miniaturise the weapons, a plutonium based 
warhead is the answer, but the question arises 
on the design, development, realisation and 
deployment of an untested system. However, 
the setting up of the series of reactors at 
Khushab indicates that Pakistan is seriously 
considering the Plutonium based option.
The issue for Pakistan is one of Uranium 
availability. Its own reserves are limited and of 
poor ore concentration. As a non-member state 
of the NPT regime, it cannot import uranium for 
strategic purposes.54 Pakistan will have to do a 
major balancing act between the HEU and Pu 
54 Even if Pakistan were a member state of the NPT, importing fissile material for strategic purposes is a right which 
is available only to Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) as defined under the NPT.
production-maybe even freeze the production 
of HEU. The possible production scenario is 
shown in Figure 10.
From the above table, the following 
conclusions (Table 3 and 4) can be arrived at 
in terms of Pakistan’s HEU and the Plutonium 
stockpile:
Table 3: Pakistani Highly Enriched 
Uranium (HEU) stockpile
Uranium available 1980-98 451 t
Uranium available 2003-10 216 t
Uranium available 2010-12 28 t
Total (Which will yield 3220kg of HEU) 695 t
Note: The OECD/IAEA estimates for uranium production for the years 1998-2000 is 23 ton per year and in 2001 it is 
listed as 16 tons. Only from 2002, the higher production figures of 40 tons are indicated. Consequently, it is assumed, 
even though K-1 was ready in 1998, its feedstock was available only from 2000.
Figure 10: Possible Uranium utilisation
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Assuming 20 kg of HEU per weapon 
and subtracting 120 kg from the inventory as 
already used for the 1998 tests, the remaining 
inventory of 3100 kg (till 2012) will translate 
to 155 warheads.
Table 4: Pakistani Plutonium (Pu) 
Stockpile
Uranium 
diverted for Pu 
2003-10
8 x 13 =104 t
Which is equivalent 
to 92kg of Pu
Uranium 
diverted for Pu 
2010-12
26 x 2 =  52 t
Which is equivalent 




Assuming 6 kg of Pu per weapon, this will 
translate to 23 warheads. As a linear implosion 
device will use nearly double the quantity of Pu, 
the Pu inventory will be adequate only for 12 
TNW warheads.
In addition to the inventory of 23 
warheads, if the total uranium output is 
diverted for Pu processing, Pakistan will be able 
add 5-6 warheads every year. This translates 
into addition of an untested weapon to the 
arsenal in very limited numbers which means 
it will take years to build a reasonable arsenal.
The ultimate question is how will Pakistan 
utilise its limited uranium reserves? Will it 
consider its tested HEU weapons in stock as 
adequate for its security or will it consider it 
necessary to diversify its stockpile? Another 
important question to consider is whether 
Pakistan will divert all or part of its uranium 
reserves for production of an untested Plutonium 
based weapon. Even here will Islamabad lay 
stress on Plutonium weapons for use with its 
cruise missiles like Babur and Ra’ad or will it 
deploy them on NASR despite its rather limited 
damage potential.55 
55 For more details on Pakistan’s Cruise Missiles see, Rajaram Nagappa and S. Chandrashekar, “An Assessment 
of Pakistan’s Babur HATF 7 Cruise Missile,” NIAS Report R-5-07, 2007, National Institute of Advanced Studies, 
Bangalore, available at http://isssp.in/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/An-Assessment-of-Pakistans-Babur-HATF-7-
Cruise-Missile.pdf.
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India’s Cold Start rattled Pakistan and put a 
question mark - of some sort - on the logic of its 
nuclear strategy. Pakistan feels that India by its 
military doctrine had blurred the lines between 
sub-conventional and conventional warfare. On 
the other hand, the introduction of NASR as a 
response to CSD is seen by Indian analysts as 
threatening to lower the threshold for nuclear 
use and in essence a repeat of its threat to 
escalate a conventional military response to the 
nuclear level. 
With NASR, Pakistan in essence has fallen 
back on its time-tested option of threatening 
to use its nuclear weapons in an attempt to 
involve the international community and 
thereby counter India’s conventional military 
asymmetry. The problem with the Pakistani 
response given the limited objectives of any 
Indian strike under ‘Cold Start’ is that it might 
not be taken seriously and as a result could 
weaken the Pakistani deterrent.
However, Pakistan’s thinking behind 
employing NASR could be to provide a flexible 
response to its decision-makers; something 
between massive (suicidal) response, engaging 
in conventional battle, and doing nothing. 
NASR, as viewed in Pakistan, fits in a much-
desired “graded and proportional punitive 
retaliation option.”56 As stated by Adil Sultan, 
“these perceived gaps at the operational and 
tactical levels were, therefore, needed to be 
plugged- to deny India the space to launch 
limited military operations in the form of Cold 
Start Doctrine”.57 
The acquisition of TNWs is yet another 
attempt to deny India any opportunity to fight a 
limited conflict with Pakistan. This is particularly 
important for Islamabad. According to Mansoor 
Ahmed, the testing of NASR highlights the 
qualitative shift in its nuclear posture by 
including counter-force and usable response 
options as opposed to a disproportionate 
nuclear response to a conventional conflict.58
As Pakistan’s conventional forces are 
deemed inadequate to deal with India’s 
conventional military onslaught, Islamabad 
believes that deploying TNWs would serve 
as a deterrent; based on the notion that any 
conventional attack from India’s side would 
lead to the usage of TNWs, which could 
commAnd And control, riSkS And imPlicAtion 
for indo-PAk nucleAr deterrence
56 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Tactical Nuclear Weapon: Deterrence Stability between India and Pakistan,” US-Pakistan 
Strategic Partnership: A Track II Dialogue, Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC), Monterey, United States, January 
2012, available at <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=142884.
57 Adil Sultan, “Pakistan’s emerging nuclear posture: impact of drivers and technology on nuclear doctrine,” Institute 
of Strategic Studies Islamabad, available at http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1340000409_86108059.
pdf.
58 Mansoor Ahmed, “Why Pakistan needs tactical nuclear weapons,” Pulse, May 06, 2011, available at http://www.
weeklypulse.org/details.aspx?contentID=563&storylist=9.
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snowball into a nuclear fledged nuclear war. 
Many in Pakistan believe that TNWs provide the 
country a “value-added deterrence”, a notion 
reiterated by Rabia Akhtar who affirms that “a 
weapon that is small and usable possesses more 
deterrent value than a weapon which is big and 
has strategic value.” Aktar argues that HATF IX 
adds to the uncertainty in the adversary’s mind 
about the exact nature of Pakistan’s response 
in conjunction with its ambiguous “No No First 
Use (NNFU) posture which makes Pakistan’s 
deterrence effective.”59 Consequently, Pakistan 
believes the possession of ‘usable nuclear 
weapons’ was needed to act as a deterrent 
against India.
aNalySIS of NaSR’S damage PoteNtIal 
Given that Pakistan sees NASR as a 
battlefield nuclear weapon, it is also useful to 
see the weapon’s actual damage potential say 
against armoured divisions more importantly 
against tanks and Armoured Personnel Vehicles 
(APVs) against which it will be fielded in battle.
AH Nayyar and Zia Mian have indicated 
that an overpressure of 3 atm is required to 
damage and incapacitate a tank.60 It is also seen 
that a 1 kT explosion at a height of about 150 
m produces overpressures of this 3 atmosphere 
at a horizontal distance of 170 m from ground 
zero. The distance ratio scales as 1/3 power of 
the ratio of the yields and in case the yield is in 
the sub kiloton range, the horizontal distance 
will be much less. Assuming the same height of 
burst, the horizontal distance for 3 atmosphere 
overpressure against yield is shown in Table 3 
below: 
Table 5: Yield vs horizontal boundary of 
3 atm overpressure
Yield of Weapon Horizontal distance 
100 t 79.5 m
250 t 108 m
500 t 135 m
750 t 155 m
1000 t 170 m
It is understood that for the United States, 
an armoured formation for deliberate attack or 
breakthrough could use vehicle spacing of the 
50 m apart from each other and the distance 
between the rows of tanks could be 200-250 m, 
which would translate to 80 tanks in a square 
kilometer (km2).61 In such a worst case scenario 
not more than 3 tanks can be placed in a circle of 
170 m diameter representing the 3 atmosphere 
overpressure boundary. For such a worst case 
scenario 27 high accuracy missiles will be 
needed to incapacitate all the tanks in the 1 
square km (km2) grid. In the normal scenario, 
the battlefield commander will deploy the tanks 
with larger inter-tank distances to limit the 
damage potential. For example, maintaining 
the inter-tank distance to 200 m spread over 8 
rows will reduce by half the number of tanks in 
the grid. 
Even with a larger weapon system, the 
damage potential is low. Nayyar and Zia Mian 
estimate, a weapon with a yield of 15 kT could 
decapitate about 55 tanks if the inter-tank 
59 Rabia Akhtar, “NASR And Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrence,” Eurasia Review, May 02, 2011, available at  http://
www.eurasiareview.com/02052011-nasr-and-pakistans-nuclear-deterrence-analysis/.
60 AH Nayyar and Zia Mian, “The Limited Military Utility of Pakistan’s Battlefield Use of Nuclear Weapons in Re-
sponse to Large Scale Indian Conventional Attack,” Pakistan Security Research Unit, Brief Number 61,  Department 
of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK, November 2010.
61 Nayyar and Mian, Pakistan Security Research Unit.
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distance is 100 m. For an inter-tank distance 
of 300 m, to incapacitate 55 tanks, eight 15 kT 
weapons would be needed.  
With the damage radius from a 1 kT 
weapon close to 170 m a number of TEL’s each 
equipped with four missiles will have to be 
deployed close to the battlefield and inviting 
retaliation.
Thus, it can be seen that NASR’s likely 
damage potential is rather limited. The crew 
inside a tank has adequate protection against 
thermal and radiation effects and is equipped 
to operate in an NBC environment. Thus, the 
much touted battlefield utility of the NASR is 
minimal. Instead of providing any advantage in 
battle, it is likely to pose greater problems for 
Pakistan’s armed forces. 
PakIStaN’S NucleaR commaNd aNd 
coNtRol StRuctuRe
Pakistan’s nuclear command and control 
(C2) is an important aspect which merits 
further consideration given the likelihood that 
NASR would be pre-delegated to battlefield 
commanders if it has to be used in battle. 
In such a situation nuclear command and 
control becomes more important and crucial 
factor ensuring the continuance of deterrence 
between India and Pakistan.  This section will 
look at the command and control of Pakistan 
nuclear forces which is predominantly under 
the military’s control. As in India’s case, the 
structure has come into existence after the 1998 
nuclear tests. 
Existing nuclear command and control 
structure
After General Musharraf took over as 
the Chief of Army Staff, he consolidated the 
nuclear programme under complete military 
control.62 With the establishment of the 
National Command Authority (NCA) in 2000 
all strategic institutions crucial to nuclear and 
missile programmes such as the Khan Research 
Laboratories (KRL), National Engineering and 
Scientific Commission (NESCOM), Pakistan 
Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and the 
Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research 
Commission (SUPARCO), came under the NCA’s 
control.63 
The current command and control structure 
comprises three tiers, i.e. the National Command 
Authority (NCA) at the top; the Strategic Plans 
Division (SPD) which acts as the NCA’s secretariat 
as the second tier; followed by the three services’ 
(Army, Air Force and Navy) strategic forces 
command. It is based on C4I2SR (command, 
control, communication, computers, intelligence, 
information, surveillance and reconnaissance). 
Even though the structure has undergone many 
changes (including greater civilian participation) 
since its formulation; the real power continues to 
rest with the Pakistan Army. 
The 2007 National Command Authority 
Ordinance stipulates the role of the NCA to 
exercise “complete command and control 
over research, development, production and 
use of nuclear and space technologies … and 
to provide for the safety and security of all 
62 ‘Pakistan’s nuclear oversight reforms’ in Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation 
networks, IISS Strategic Dossiers, 2007, available at http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm/
nuclear-black-market-dossier-a-net-assesment/pakistans-nuclear-oversight-reforms/#western.
63 Pakistan’s nuclear oversight reforms, IISS Strategic Dossiers.
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personnel, facilities, information, installations 
or organisations” with regard to the nuclear 
and space programmes.64 The NCA, which 
is composed of civilian and military officials 
bifurcates into two committees specifically, the 
Employment Control Committee (ECC)65 and 
the Development Control Committee (DCC).66 
Pakistan’s nuclear command and control 
structure   is depicted in Figure 11.
In order for a decision for a nuclear launch, 
it is likely that a consensus would be required 
with the final vote cast by the NCA Chairman.68 
Observers have however noted that in case a 
consensus cannot be reached a majority decision 
64 Eric Auner, “Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Now Under PM,” Arms Control Association, January/February 2010, 
available at http://www.armscontrol.org/print/4046.
65 The ECC overlooks the country’s nuclear strategy, deployment and engagement of strategic forces, in addition to 
periodically reviewing strategic threat perceptions, weaponry’s developmental progress and establishing guide-
lines for effective C2 practices. See, Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Prolifera-
tion and Security Issues, Congressional Research Service, February 13, 2013, available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf.
66 The DCC exercises control over all the strategic organisations that participate in the nuclear programme. See, 
Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues”, Congressio-
nal Research Service, March 19, 2013, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf.
67 Pakistan’s nuclear oversight reforms’ in Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of prolifera-
tion networks, IISS Strategic Dossiers, 2007, available at http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/
nbm/nuclear-black-market-dossier-a-net-assesment/pakistans-nuclear-oversight-reforms/#western. The figure 
has been slightly amended to incorporate the change stipulated by the National Command Authority Act, 2010 
(Replacement of the Chairman by the Prime Minister).
68 Pakistan’s nuclear oversight reforms, IISS Strategic Dossiers.
Figure 11: Pakistan’s nuclear command and control structure67
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would suffice.69 Previously, the post of the NCA 
Chairman was held by the President of Pakistan 
but this changed with implementation of the 
National Command Authority Act 2010, which 
appointed the PM as the head of the NCA. The 
2010 Act became law with the passing of the 18th 
Amendment in April 2010. Thus on paper it is the 
Pakistani PM who is responsible for taking the 
final decision on a nuclear strike, but the reality on 
the ground is quite different. When analysing the 
NCA structure, it becomes evident that majority of 
the positions are held by serving or retired military 
officers. Clearly, the military, specifically the Army, 
remains in charge of the nuclear command and 
control and has the final say in carrying out a 
nuclear strike. As Amir Mir, a senior Pakistani 
journalist states, “General Kayani and Lt. Gen. 
Khalid Kidwai have their fingers on the N-button 
and would exercise complete control with little 
regard for the will of the Prime Minister.”70
The SPD acts as the Secretariat for the 
NCA and plays a pivotal role in Pakistan’s 
nuclear command structure. It is tasked to 
formulate policy options, execute the NCA’s 
69 Bruno Tertrais, “Pakistan’s nuclear and WMD programmes: Status, Evolution and Risks,” Non-Proliferation 
Papers No. 19, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, July 2012, available at http://www.nonproliferation.eu/docu-
ments/nonproliferationpapers/brunotertrais5010305e17790.pdf.











































































Figure 12: Structure of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD)
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operational plans and directions on the service 
levels, in coordination with the three services’ 
SFCs.71 Figure 12 provides an overview of 
the organisation of the SPD. As of 2012, the 
SPD is believed to comprise of 150 officers72 
drawn from the three armed forces and enjoys 
immense administrative influence in terms of 
research and development; and production of 
ballistic and cruise missiles.73 The branch is 
headed since its creation by a three-star general 
namely Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai; indicating the 
Army’s dominance in the nuclear command and 
control structure. Needless to say, the Army’s 
SFC enjoys maximum power for it remains in-
charge of all the operational missiles.74 
Possible changes in Pakistan’s Command 
and Control due to NASR
After an overview of the strategic nuclear 
command and control, it is germane to look at 
how NASR would impact the current command 
and control structure. The complications involved 
with the fielding of NASR missile include 
the dilemma of pre-delegation of authority 
to battlefield commanders or centralised 
control. There are two aspects to the above 
quandary. In case of delegation of control to 
local commanders, the possibility of accidental 
or unauthorised launch increases. On the other 
hand, extreme centralised control over the 
71 Bruno Tertrais, “Pakistan’s nuclear and WMD programmes: Status, Evolution and Risks,” Non-Proliferation 
Papers No. 19, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, July 2012, available at http://www.nonproliferation.eu/docu-
ments/nonproliferationpapers/brunotertrais5010305e17790.pdf.
72 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, California: Stanford Security Studies, 2012, 
p. 332.
73 Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), available at http://www.nti.org/facilities/585/.
74 Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI).
75 Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear command-and-control in South Asia during Peace, Crisis and War,” Contemporary 
South Asia, 2005, 14(2), pp. 163-17.
76 Scott D. Sagan, James J. Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and 
Chemical Weapons, New York: Cornell University Press, 2000, p. 75.
weapons may make these weapons vulnerable to 
a pre-emptive strike. Also increased centralised 
control defeats the very purpose that such 
weapons are supposed to serve, which is of being 
employed in the battlefield against advancing 
Indian conventional forces.
Also, in operational terms, due to the short 
range of the missile, it is likely that the weapon 
system would be stationed near the border making 
it relatively difficult for the central authority 
to exercise absolute control over them. The 
introduction of such a tactical nuclear weapon 
(TNW) system would inexorably require a degree 
of pre-delegation to the local commanders due 
to operational exigencies, as also reflected in the 
case studies of other countries like the US and 
Russia which employ tactical nuclear weapons.
It is therefore highly likely that the Pakistani 
Army would institute devolution practices while 
inducting NASR into service. This is reinforced 
by Brig (Retd) Feroz Hassan Khan, former 
deputy director of Pakistan’s SPD who states 
that, “partial pre-delegation, especially for the 
weaker side, would be an operational necessity 
because dispersed nuclear forces as well as 
central command authority (National Command 
Authority) are vulnerable.”75 Interestingly, 
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema remarks that “perhaps 
even Corps Commanders would be involved in 
the decision to use nuclear weapons.”76 
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With TNWs at play in a future Indo-
Pak conflict, Pakistan’s nuclear posture and 
command and control would have to undergo 
a metamorphosis. The TNWs would most likely 
be used when conventional war is already 
underway (with the exception being a pre-
emptive attack) when communication systems 
and command and control structures are already 
under pressure. This will thus add another layer 
of complexity to the already complex system. In 
order to obviate the possibility of a pre-emptive 
Indian strike on its TNW assets and for use in 
battle, pre-delegation would in all likelihood 
be necessary so that the battlefield commander 
takes stock of the dynamic situation and 
responds adequately keeping in mind several 
factors including survivability of the weapon 
system and his current position vis-à-vis the 
enemy in battle. 
In a war, the situation remains dynamic, 
demanding quick decisions and executions. The 
time taken to receive release authorisations from 
the higher echelons would be long, considering 
the swiftness with which the situation on a 
battlefield changes. The period may wary 
from few hours (6-7 hours) to days (1-2 days), 
depending on various factors like the military 
situation, C2 efficiency and other technical 
issues before a go-ahead can be given. Keeping 
these aspects in mind, the Pakistani military 
would logically want to minimise any delay, 
and lay down procedures that ensure quick 
assembly of the weapon, identification and 
engagement of the targets, which necessitates 
pre-delegation to front commanders. 
NaSR: tHe RISkS INvolved
The deployment of TNWs in a conflict 
necessitates a degree of pre-delegated 
authority. The practice of pre-delegation 
in itself is a concern because during times 
of heightened crisis, one can expect the 
warhead and the missile to be mated with 
the commanders being given a degree 
of authority in employing the weapons. 
Thus, during crisis decisions taken by the 
commanders to use the weapons, may 
be affected by stress, misinformation or 
breakdown in communication links and in 
extreme situations even panic. 
The dangers of NASR are threefold; 
namely, inadvertent escalation, unauthorised 
use or loss of possession.77 The first, namely 
inadvertent escalation, could take place when 
either side uses nuclear weapons without 
actually intending to do so. This is in essence, 
the ‘use them or lose them’ dilemma. Faced with 
a worsening situation on battle front and posed 
with the possible danger of defeat, a battlefield 
commander could decide to use such tactical 
nuclear weapons. Thus, pre-delegation clearly 
increases the dangers of inadvertent escalation 
where use of such a nuclear weapon might take 
place without the country actually wanting to 
do so. 
The second danger posed by tactical 
nuclear weapons like NASR is unauthorised 
use where the weapon is used by military 
commanders without due authorisation. Brig. 
Feroz Khan has pointed to the likelihood of such 
a situation and states: 
77 For more on the dangers of unintended use of nuclear weapons in South Asia see, Rajesh Rajagopalan “The Threat 
of Unintended Use of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia,” in E. Sridharan, Ed., The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relation-
ship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations, New Delhi: Routledge, 2007, pp. 266-286.
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“…communications invariably get 
disrupted in a conventional war… in the event of 
a command breakdown…a theatre commander, 
seeing the opponent’s forces marching into 
his area of responsibility, would be hard-
pressed to stand by and take no action. In the 
absence of communication with authorised 
national command authorities, such a theatre 
commander would probably take matters into 
his own hands.”78 
This scenario illustrates the degree of 
stress under which the field commander will 
have to take his decisions and such occurrences 
may convince him to jump to the highest rung 
thereby further escalating the crisis.
The third danger posed by NASR is loss 
of possession of the actual weapon. This could 
either be when the nuclear weapon falls into 
the hands of terrorist or when it falls into the 
hands of the adversary. This also raises the 
added dilemma of what Scott Sagan describes 
as ‘goal displacement,’ with nuclear weapons 
being identified with national pride and 
security to such an extent that ends and means 
get confused.79 Thus, rather than providing 
deterrence and securing Pakistan, the nation 
has to spend additional money and resources to 
safeguard the weapon and ensure that it does 
not fall into wrong hands. 
Given that battlefield nuclear weapons 
like NASR will be pre-delegated, it raises the 
chances both of inadvertent and unauthorised 
use. In addition, due to weaker command and 
control given the fact that the weapons might 
be used in a battlefield scenario; it also raises 
the dangers of the actual weapon system falling 
into hands of the advancing adversary (Indian 
forces) as well as jehadi groups with or without 
insider help. 
NaSR aNd tHe RobuStNeSS of NucleaR 
deteRReNce betWeeN INdIa aNd PakIStaN 
Crucial in one’s success in a signalling 
game is whether the adversary perceives one’s 
signal as a strong or a weak signal. Despite 
international concerns following Pakistan’s 
claims about NASR, in New Delhi it has been 
life as usual. This is largely due to doubts about 
Pakistan’s claim that NASR is nuclear capable. It 
is most likely that the nuclear warhead - which 
can fit into NASR given its dimensions - would 
be a plutonium based linear-implosion device. 
During its 1998 nuclear tests Pakistan did not 
test a plutonium device. Fielding an untested 
device would weaken Pakistan’s deterrent 
and is therefore counterproductive. Another 
reason for doubting Pakistan’s claim is the low 
quality of Pakistan’s natural uranium ore. As 
discussed in previous sections, there are doubts 
whether it can produce enough fissile material 
to simultaneously stockpile uranium and 
plutonium based weapons in enough numbers. 
These reasons lead New Delhi doubt 
Islamabad’s claim that its short-range NASR is 
nuclear capable. Therefore, despite having the 
capability to miniaturise its nuclear warheads 
and the requisite delivery platform, India has 
not found it necessary to respond to NASR, 
despite claims to the contrary being made 
by Pakistani scholars.80 Islamabad should re-
78 Feroze Hassan Khan, “Challenges to Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” Non-Proliferation Review, 10(1), 2003, pp. 
59–74, available at http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/101khan.pdf.
79 Scott Sagan, Inside Nuclear South Asia, pg. 237.
80 Zahir Kazmi, “SRBMs, Deterrence and Regional Stability South Asia: A case study of NASR and Prahar,” Institute 
of Regional Studies, Islamabad, available at http://www.irs.org.pk/strategic/spso12.pdf
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consider its gambit of lowering its nuclear 
threshold to counter an assault by the Indian 
military. An important question for Islamabad’s 
strategists to ponder over is whether Pakistan’s 
deterrent capability strengthened or weakened 
by the NASR? As pointed to from the above 
discussion, the answer is the latter. Surely, a 
weak nuclear deterrent cannot be in Pakistan’s 
national interest.
Does NASR signify a shift from first use 
to first strike? Does it mean further lowering 
of the nuclear threshold by Pakistan in order 
to counter India’s Cold Start doctrine and take 
away from India the space and the option to 
respond to a low-intensity conflict waged by 
Pakistan by way of supporting terrorist groups 
to carry out attacks in Kashmir and in other 
parts of India? Given that Pakistan’s strategy of 
supporting terror groups is a low cost, low risk 
operation with the significant benefit of tying 
down Indian military and security forces, it 
would not like to give up this option. 
The red lines as outlined by General Kidwai 
and by statements made by several Pakistani 
leaders have been understood to mean that 
Pakistan’s threshold is not very low. However, 
with NASR, in a bid to provide Pakistan with a 
flexible option and in order to retain the sub-
conventional conflict going, has this changed? 
One has to ponder whether Pakistan is signalling 
a lowering of its threshold for nuclear use to 
situation where it would respond or threaten to 
respond against limited conventional ‘punitive’ 
strikes carried out by India in response to say 
another Mumbai 26/11 type terrorist attack or 
explosion of a radiological dispersal device. 
However, it would be important for 
Pakistan’s decision makers to remember that 
the Indian nuclear doctrine does not distinguish 
between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons 
or such use. India continues to adopt a no-
first use (NFU) policy and its nuclear doctrine 
clearly assures ‘massive retaliation inflicting 
unacceptable damage’ against ‘nuclear attack on 
Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.’ 
An important question to ponder over and 
one that holds some importance for nuclear 
stability in the Indian sub-continent is whether 
NASR is leading Pakistan into a ‘commitment 
trap.’ It would be wise to guard against a 
situation where Pakistan would be forced to 
follow through just because of its past assertions. 
Given that Pakistan has made statements about 
all that NASR can achieve, would it be forced 
into a position where it will have to follow 
through in order to maintain the credibility 
of its claims. It is unclear how organisational 
biases will impinge on Pakistan’s decisions of 
threatening to use nuclear weapons even if the 
situation is fairly low on the threat matrix and 
does not warrant such a threat or use. 
coNcluSIoN
NASR poses multiple dangers for the 
robustness of nuclear deterrence between India 
and Pakistan. These can be categorised into 
three categories; namely, credibility-related; 
doctrinal-related and operational-related. 
The credibility-related problem in essence 
can be traced back to the fact that the nuclear 
warhead used in NASR has not been tested by 
Pakistan. As a result of this, Pakistan’s nuclear 
deterrent is weakened. 
The second problem is doctrinal. The 
Pakistani employment of NASR could possibly 
signify a shift from a ‘first-use’ policy to a 
‘first strike’ policy. This could be as a result of 
Pakistan’s search for more flexible responses. 
This could translate into situations where 
Islamabad could threaten to use its nuclear 
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weapons even in situations where such a threat 
or use would not be necessary and therefore not 
credible. 
Another ‘doctrinal-related’ danger flows 
out of the Indian nuclear doctrine. New Delhi’s 
nuclear doctrine does not differentiate between 
a tactical and a strategic weapon or such use of 
a nuclear weapon. As stated in the doctrine and 
more recently by the NSAB Chairman, Shyam 
Saran, India’s response in case nuclear weapons 
are used against it or its forces anywhere 
would be a massive. He states, “… the label 
on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, 
strategic or tactical, is irrelevant from the Indian 
perspective.”81 This makes it amply clear that 
the doctrinal flexibility that Pakistan is looking 
to explore is unachievable given New Delhi’s 
nuclear doctrine.
The third set of problems posed by NASR 
is operational-related. As outlined in earlier 
paragraphs given that pre-delegation would 
be resorted to by Pakistan, the weapon system 
would increase the dangers of inadvertent, 
unauthorised use. Also, given that the weapon 
system would be stationed close to the border 
and on the battlefield it is very likely that the 
command and control and physical security 
of the weapon would undergo a lot of strain 
especially under conflict situations. Pre-
delegation also opens up the additional danger 
of a nuclear capable NASR being stolen by jehadi 
groups (with or without insider help) and also a 
situation where NASR could fall into the hands 
of the advancing Indian troops given that it is 
likely to be stationed close to the border given 
it short range. 
Another operational challenge for Pakistan 
is that the number of weapons which it would 
be able to produce - given the availability of its 
raw fissile material would be small. It would 
therefore not make any substantial difference 
to the numbers of nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s 
arsenal. Also, as discussed in previous sections, 
NASR is unlikely to provide any great advantage 
to Pakistan in the battlefield given its limited 
damage potential against tanks and armoured 
carrier vehicles. 
Thus, Pakistan’s gambit of using NASR to 
signal a lowering of its nuclear threshold to 
counter any conventional military operation by 
India is likely to pose challenges for robustness 
of nuclear deterrence between Pakistan and 
India. An important question to ponder over 
and one that holds some importance for 
nuclear stability in the Indian sub-continent 
is whether NASR is leading Pakistan into a 
‘commitment trap.’ It would be wise to guard 
against a situation where Pakistan would be 
forced to follow through just because of its past 
assertions. 
The study shows that a weapon system like 
NASR has more disadvantages than advantages 
from all considerations ranging from damage 
potential to impact on deterrence stability.
81 Shyam Saran, “Is India’s Nuclear Deterrent Credible?” April 24, 2013, India Habitat Centre, New Delhi.
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